We use these services and cookies to improve your user experience. You may opt out if you wish, however, this may limit some features on this site.
Please see our statement on Data Privacy.
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: selinux,smack: don't bypass permissions check in inode_setsecctx hook Marek Gresko reports that the root user on an NFS client is able to change the security labels on files on an NFS filesystem that is exported with root squashing enabled. The end of the kerneldoc comment for __vfs_setxattr_noperm() states: * This function requires the caller to lock the inode's i_mutex before it * is executed. It also assumes that the caller will make the appropriate * permission checks. nfsd_setattr() does do permissions checking via fh_verify() and nfsd_permission(), but those don't do all the same permissions checks that are done by security_inode_setxattr() and its related LSM hooks do. Since nfsd_setattr() is the only consumer of security_inode_setsecctx(), simplest solution appears to be to replace the call to __vfs_setxattr_noperm() with a call to __vfs_setxattr_locked(). This fixes the above issue and has the added benefit of causing nfsd to recall conflicting delegations on a file when a client tries to change its security label.
Reserved 2024-09-11 | Published 2024-09-13 | Updated 2024-11-05 | Assigner Linuxgit.kernel.org/...c/2dbc4b7bac60b02cc6e70d05bf6a7dfd551f9dda
git.kernel.org/...c/fe0cd53791119f6287b6532af8ce41576d664930
git.kernel.org/...c/eebec98791d0137e455cc006411bb92a54250924
git.kernel.org/...c/459584258d47ec3cc6245a82e8a49c9d08eb8b57
git.kernel.org/...c/f71ec019257ba4f7ab198bd948c5902a207bad96
git.kernel.org/...c/76a0e79bc84f466999fa501fce5bf7a07641b8a7
Support options